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INTRODUCTION

The Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act, 1 effective in 1917,2 was a
startling departure from common law. The Act required an employee to
abrogate all his common law remedies and to accept fixed benefits. Concomitantly, it required an employer to abrogate all his common law defenses, such as contributory negligence and assumption of risk. 3 In place of
the common law compensatory system, the Act provided injured workers
with monetary relief from on-the-job injuries in a separate forum that became known as the Industrial Commission of Colorado.
The Act has grown in bulk, and litigation over it has mushroomed as a
result of incessant mutations over the years. 4 The most sweeping changes in
the Act occurred in September 1, 1975 when vocational rehabilitation benefits were enacted, 5 the Occupational Disease Disability Act was repealed
with vestiges reenacted and incorporated within the Workmen's Compensation Act, 6 and lifetime benefits were created for certain dependents of fatally
7
injured workers.
Benefits have increased in a dizzying spiral since the Act was first
promulgated. For the period from July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1980, benefits for each compensable accident included $20,000 for medical expenses
and vocational rehabilitation, 8 $222.74 per week maximum for temporary
total and permanent total disability, 9 and $84 per week for permanent partial disability.'o
Although the legislature structured the Act to dispense compensation
benefits under highly technical formulae, litigation persists despite the antiseptic quality of the statutory language. The bulk of the litigation has produced philosophical catch-lines based on public policy: (1) the purpose of
the Act is to protect all workers, except those specifically excluded, by providing a scheme of compensation benefits to be paid by the employer; " (2)
1. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-40-101 to -54-127 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
2. Colorado, following New York's lead, was the second state to enact a workmen's compensation act. New York had imported the concept from Germany, the origin of workmen's
compensation during Bismarck's massive social reforms.
3. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-42-101 to -205 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
4. State Compensation Insurance Fund, the single largest workmen's compensation carrier in Colorado, reports that from July 1, 1975 to January 1, 1979 (3 1/2 years), 52,287 claims
were litigated. This figure does not include an even larger number of injuries reported by
employers to the Division of Labor for which benefits were voluntarily paid by the insurer.
During the same period, State Compensation Insurance Fund paid $51,738,526 in compensation benefits.
Over 7,300 new cases were filed with the Colorado Division of Labor just in the month of
August 1979. More than 1,200 of the claims filed each month with the Division are set for
hearing and litigated. This dramatic volume of litigation includes a striking number of formerly esoteric claims; e.g., carcinomas, harmful substances exposure, employment harrassment,
nervous breakdowns, and cardiovascular congestion. The impact on employers is reflected by a
97.1% insurance premium increase since September 1, 1975.
5. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-49-101(4)-(6) (Supp. 1979).
6. Id § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).

7. Id. § 8-50-103 (Supp. 1979).
8. Id § 8-49-101(1)(a), (4) (Supp. 1979).
9. See Appendix V zhfa.
10. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-108(I)(b) (Supp. 1979).
11. City of Boulder v. Payne, 162 Colo. 345, 426 P.2d 194 (1967); University of Denver v.
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the Act should provide a remedy in areas where remedies did not exist at
common law; 12 (3) the Act is highly remedial and beneficent in purpose, and
should be liberally construed so as to accomplish that intent;' 3 and (4) the
4
referee is vested with wide discretion in awarding benefits under the Act.'
As a result, knowledge of workmen's compensation law requires careful
study of the prescriptive language contained in the Act, the interpretations
placed on the Act by the Colorado Supreme Court and the Colorado Court
of Appeals, and the idiosyncrasies of each referee in making his own interpretation of both the Act and reported case law.
This treatise provides an overview of the permanent disability benefits
provided under the Act through a discussion of the statutory language of
each section dealing with permanent partial or permanent total disability,
court decisions interpreting each section, and the impact of the referee's discretionary role in applying a particular section.
I.

SCHEDULE OF PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS

The Act sets forth a detailed schedule of permanent disability benefits
compartmentalized into thirty-six categories distinguished from each other
by a separate anatomical injury. 1 5 Conspicuously absent are any provisions
Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Drake v. Hodges, 114 Colo. 10, 161 P.2d 338
(1945); Consolidated Fast Freight v. Walker, 103 Colo. 347, 85 P.2d 720 (1938); Sechler v.
Pastore, 103 Colo. 139, 84 P.2d 61 (1938); Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 102 Colo. 26,
77 P.2d 130 (1938).
12. Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co., 142 Colo. 294, 350 P.2d 1044 (1960).
13. James v. Irrigation Motor & Pump Co., 180 Colo. 195, 503 P.2d 1025 (1972); Martin
Marietta Corp. v. Faulk, 158 Colo. 441, 407 P.2d 348 (1965); Idarado Mining Co. v. Barnes, 148
Colo. 166, 365 P.2d 36 (1961); Industrial Comm'n v. Baldwin, 139 Colo. 268, 338 P.2d 103
(1959); Snyder v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Colo. 523, 335 P.2d 543 (1959); University of Denver
v. Industrial Comm'n, 138 Colo. 505, 335 P.2d 292 (1959); Graden Coal Co. v. Yturralde, 137
Colo. 527, 328 P.2d 105 (1958); Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698
(1957); University of Denver v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953); Industrial Comm'n
v. Corwin Hosp., 126 Colo, 358, 250 P.2d 135 (1952); Industrial Comm'n v. Golden Cycle
Corp., 126 Colo. 68, 246 P.2d 902 (1952); L.B. Cole Produce Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 123
Colo. 278, 228 P.2d 808 (1951); Continental Oil Co. v. Sirhall, 122 Colo, 332, 222 P.2d 612
(1950); National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950); Arvas v. McNeil Coal
Corp., 119 Colo. 289, 203 P.2d 906 (1949); Great Am. Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 114
Colo. 91, 162 P.2d 413 (1945); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Ill Colo. 470, 143
P.2d 267 (1943); Skjoldahl v. Industrial Comm'n, 108 Colo. 140, 113 P.2d 871 (1941); McNeil
Coal Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 105 Colo. 263, 96 P.2d 889 (1939); McBride v. Industrial
Comm'n, 97 Colo. 166, 49 P.2d 386 (1935); Danielson v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 Colo. 522, 44
P.2d 1011 (1935); Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 84 Colo, 481, 271 P. 617
(1928); Employers' Mut. Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 283, 176 P. 314 (1918); Karoly
v. Industrial Comm'n, 65 Colo. 239, 176 P. 284 (1918); Industrial Comm'n.v. Johnson, 64 Colo.
461, 172 P. 422 (1918); Claimants v. Director of Div. of Labor, 31 Colo. App. 141, 500 P.2d 1186
(1972).
14. See Industrial Comm'n v. Seastone, 167 Colo. 571, 448 P.2d 963 (1969); Industrial
Comm'n v. Cutshall, 164 Colo. 240, 433 P.2d 765 (1967); Bowlus v. Industrial Comm'n, 152
Colo. 535, 383 P.2d 789 (1963); University of Denver v. Johnston, 151 Colo. 465, 378 P.2d 830
(1963); Idarado Mining Co. v. Barnes, 148 Colo. 166, 363 P.2d 36 (1961); University of Denver
v. Nemeth, 127 Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1953).
15. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-104 (1973) is set forth below in its entirety.
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for injuries to the head (except for vision and hearing), neck, or trunk of the
(1) In case an injury results in a loss set forth in the following schedule, the injured
employee, inaddition to compensation to be paid for temporary disability, shall receive compensation for the period as specified:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
()
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k)
(1)
(m)
(n)
(o)
(p)
(q)
(r)
(s)
(t)
(u)
(v)
(w)
(x)
(y)
(z)
(aa)
(bb)
(cc)
(dd)
(ee)
(fl)
(gg)
(hh)
(ii)
(J)

The loss of an arm at the shoulder
The loss of forearm at the elbow
The loss of a hand at the wrist
The loss of a thumb and the metacarpal bone thereof
The loss of a thumb at the proximal joint
The loss of a thumb at the second or distal joint
The loss of an index finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
The loss of an index finger at the proximal joint
Loss of an index finger at the second joint
Loss of an index finger at the distal joint
Loss of a second finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
Loss of a middle finger at the proximal joint
Loss of a middle finger at the second joint
Loss of a middle finger at the distal joint
Loss of a third or ring finger and the metacarpal bone
thereof
Loss of a ring finger at the proximal joint
Loss of a ring finger at the second joint
Loss of a ring finger at the distal joint
Loss of a little finger and the metacarpal bone thereof
Loss of a little finger at the proximal joint
Loss of a little finger at the second joint
Loss of a little finger at the distal joint
Loss of a leg at the hip joint or so near thereto as to
preclude the use of an artificial limb
Loss of a leg at or above the knee, where the stump remains
sufficient to permit the use of an artificial limb
The loss of a foot at the ankle
The loss of a great toe with the metatarsal bone thereof
The loss of a great toe at the proximal joint
The loss of a great toe at the second or distal joint
The loss of any other toe with the metatarsal bone thereof
The loss of any other toe at the proximal joint
The loss of any other toe at the second or distal joint
The loss of an eye by enucleation (including disfigurement
resulting therefrom)
Total blindness of one eye
Total deafness of both ears
Total deafness of one ear
Where workman prior to injury has suffered a total loss of
hearing in one ear, and as a result of the accident loses total
hearing in remaining ear

208
139
104
50
35
18
26
18
13
9
18
13
9
5

weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

11 weeks
7 weeks
7 weeks
4 weeks
13 weeks
9 weeks
9 weeks
4 weeks
208 weeks
139
104
26
18
9
11
4
4

weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

139
104
139
35

weeks
weeks
weeks
weeks

139 weeks

(2) The director shall determine the time when temporary disability terminates as to
injuries coming under any provision of this section.
(3) For the purpose of this schedule, permanent and complete paralysis of any member as the proximate result of accidental injury shall be deemed equivalent to the loss
thereof.
(4) If amputation is made between any two joints mentioned in this schedule, except
amputation between the knee and the hip joint, the resulting loss shall be estimated as if the
amputation had been made at the joint nearest thereto. If any portion of the bone of the
distal joint of any finger, thumb, or toe is amputated, the amount paid therefor shall be the
amount allowed for amputation at said distal joint.
(5) The amounts specified in this section shall be at the compensation rate of eightyfour dollars per week.
(6) When an injured employee sustains two or more injuries coming under this schedule, the disabilities specified in this section shall be added, and the injured employee shall
receive the sum total thereof; except that, where the injury results in the loss or partial loss of
use of the index finger and thumb of the same hand or of more than two digits of any one
hand or foot, the disability, in the discretion of the director, may be compensated on the
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body. Of the thirty-six scheduled injuries, twenty-two relate to an upper
extremity, nine to a lower extremity, two to the eyes, and three to the ears.
Impaired earning ability of the worker is not a condition precedent to
an award of benefits under the schedule. The Colorado Supreme Court
16
stated the general rule in Hawkeye-Securzto Insurance Co. v. Tupper.
Nearly all compensation acts have provisions for "scheduled
injuries".
Scheduled compensation for a specific injury is in the nature
of damages or indemnity for the physical or functional loss and is to be
awardedeven though there is no loss of earningpower or wages, and without
regardto the extent of the disability suf9ered 17
An anomaly arises under section 8-51-104(7), however, because the director may award the amount provided by the schedule of benefits or use his
discretion to award permanent partial disability under section 8-51-108. In
contrast to the indemnity rule set forth in Hawke, the Colorado Supreme
Court has upheld the loss of earning capacity test in awarding permanent
partial disability benefits."8
The director's discretion resulted from inequities built into original provisions of the Act. The schedule of disability benefits, in existence for many
decades, was designed to compensate workers for amputations, blindness, or
deafness. Originally ;, "d not include any provision to award scheduled
benefits for loss of use of affected members. Mere loss of use was compensated only under the permanent partial disability section of the Act. This
statutory scheme resulted in an unexpected inequity; higher awards were
made for "loss of use" injuries than the schedule of disability benefits allowed for amputation of the same affected member. 1 9 Consequently, the
Act was amended to permit compensation for "loss of use" of an affected
member under the scheduled benefits rather than under the permanent par20
tial disability provisions.
Subsequent to this amendment, the legislature recognized another insidious inequity. Seemingly less severe injuries were compensated for higher
basis of the partial loss of use of said hand or foot, measured respectively from the wrist or
ankle.
(7) Where an injury causes the loss of, loss of use of, or partial loss of use of any
member specified in the foregoing schedule, the director may determine the disability suffered and the amount of compensation to be awarded by awarding compensation which
bears such relation to the amount stated in the above schedule for the loss of a member as
the disabilities bear to the loss produced by the injuries named in the schedule, and such
amount shall be in addition to compensation for temporary disability; or the director may
award such compensation under the permanent partial disability section of this article as the
director in his discretion may determine from the particular facts in each case.
16. 152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963).

17.

d at 15, 380 P.2d at 32-33 (quoting 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensaiion § 306 (1958))

(emphasis added).
18. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978). For a
discussion of loss of earning capaity as a measure of permanent partial disability under the Act,
see notes 88-104 tnfra and accompanying the text.
19. See, e.g., Industrial Comm'n v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assur. Corp., 71 Colo.
115, 204 P. 338 (1922).
20. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 81-12-4, -9 (1953). See Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Tupper,
152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963).
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sums of money under section 8-51-108 than seemingly more severe injuries
which were restricted to sheduled disability compensation under section 851-104. Thus, section 8-51-104(7) was enacted to give discretion to the director to ignore the schedule specifying benefits for an injury enumerated
therein and instead award benefits for those same injuries under the formula
2
of section 8-51-108. 1
A claimant who suffers loss of use of an affected member cannot be
compensated for the same injury under both the scheduled disability and
permanent partial disability sections. In Wrid of Sleep, Inc. v. Davi's, 22 claimant suffered an injured right knee. He was awarded ten percent loss of use of
the right leg as measured at the knee under the disability schedule and an
additional ten percent for precisely the same loss under the permanent partial disability provisions. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the duplicate award was an error and remanded the case with directions to enter an
23
award under one section or the other but not both.
In practice, it comes down to which section's formula gives more money
to a claimant. That is the apparent, pragmatic criterion applied by the referee in each case of any injury included under section 8-51-104. An award is
mandated under the scheduled benefits, however, where there is no evidence
to support an award under the criteria of permanent partial disability; e.g., if
there has been a superb medical recovery with no lost earning capacity and
the claimant has returned to full time work at full pay.
Because of the discretion vested in the referee, it is incumbent upon the
practitioner to be aware of the idiosyncrasies of the referee assigned to a case
when an injury involves a body member enumerated under section 8-51-104.
The general trend of referees in the Division of Labor is to award benefits for
permanent partial disability rather than scheduled disability unless the latter would provide a higher monetary award.
II.

PERMANENT FACIAL OR BODILY DISFIGUREMENT

Although the scheduled benefits exclude any provisions for injuries to
the head, neck, or trunk of the body absent loss of vision or hearing, the Act
specifically allows a referee to award up to $2,000 for permanent facial or
bodily disfigurement. 24 Subject to the statutory limit, any award for disfigurement is discretionary. In one case, the loss of three upper front teeth
21.

CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-104(7) (1973).

22. 188 Colo. 443, 536 P.2d 34 (1975).
23. The court specifically stated that the two sections provide alternative remedies:
When an injury results in the complete or partial loss of use of a member, section
81-12-4(7) [now § 8-51-104(7)] of the Workmen's Compensation Act . . . clothes the
Commission with the discretion to determine disability, and the amount of compensation to be awarded, in one of two alternate ways: either under the "above schedule" of
section 81-12-4 or under the "permanent partial disability section of this statute,"
which is section 81-12-9 [now § 8-51-108]. While there is direct prohibition not to
consider the factors of one section while awarding under the other, we construe the use
of the disjunctive to indicate a choice, not a fusion, of the sections to be applied.
Id at 446, 536 P.2d at 35 (emphasis in the original).
24. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 8-51-105 (Supp. 1979) provides:
If any employee is seriously, permanently disfigured about the head, face, or parts
of the body normally exposed to public view, the director, in addition to all other
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constituted such a disfigurement; use of an. artificial device such as false teeth
did not alter the nature of the injury nor preclude benefits for facial disfig25
urement.
Any award under the specific provisions for such injuries is expressly in
addition to all other benefits under the Act; 26 however, the permanent partial disability provisions exclude any award of benefits for injuries specifically covered by the lump sum benefits available for disfigurement. 2 7 The
statutory language creates a conundrum which may be illustrated by the
following hypothetical.
What benefits would the Act provide if a woman who earned her livelihood as a professional photographer's model suffered a severe facial or bodily disfigurement by scarring that impaired her earning capacity? If she
were awarded benefits for disfigurement under section 8-51-105, that would
seem to be all she could gain. The provision for permanent partial disability
in section 8-51-108 specifically excludes its application if any injury has been
compensated under section 8-51-105. Although a claim for further benefits
for permanent partial disability after a specific award for disfigurement
would seemingly be denied because of this exclusionary language, such a
claim would apparently be awarded if the professional photographer's model
further alleged that embarrassment and humiliation as a result of the facial
ot bodily scarring caused her earning capacity to be impaired. In spite of
the exclusionary wording of the permanent partial disability provisions, if a
claimant can show some injury in addition to mere disfigurement, recovery
under both the lump sum and permanent partial disability sections may be
possible.
III.

PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY FROM CUMULATIVE PARTIAL
INDUSTRIAL INJURIES

Section 8-51-106, as amended in 1975, provides for the situation where a
worker suffers an accident that results in superimposing one permanent partial disability upon a previously sustained permanent partial industrial disability to produce permanent total disability. 28 To qualify for benefits in that
compensation benefits provided in this article, may allow such sum for compensation
on account thereof as he may deem just, not exceeding two thousand dollars.
25. Arkin v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879 (1961).
26. See note 24 supra.
27. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-108(l)(a) (1973). For the text of the section, see note 75 infa.
28. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-106 (1973 & Supp. 1979) reads as follows:
(1)(a) In a case where an employee has previously sustained permanent partial

industrial disability and in a subsequent injury sustains additional permanent partial
industrial disability and it is shown that the combined industrial disabilities render the
employee permanently and totally incapable of steady gainful employment and inca-

pable of rehabilitation to steady gainful employment, then the employer in whose
employ the employee sustained such subsequent injury shall be liable only for that
portion of the employee's industrial disability attributable to said subsequent injury,

and the balance of compensation due such employee on account of permanent total
disability shall be paid from the subsequent injury fund as is provided in this section.
(b) In addition to such compensation and after the completion of the payments
therefor, the employee shall continue to receive compensation at his established compensation rate for permanent total disability until death out of a special fund to be
known as the "subsequent injury fund", created for such purpose in the following
manner: For every compensable injury resulting in death wherein there are no persons
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situation, the employee must be permanently and totally (1)incapable of
steady, gainful employment and (2) incapable of rehabilitation to steady,
gainful employment. Whenever that unique combination occurs, the employer at the time of the subsequent injury is liable only for that portion of
the entire disability attributable to the subsequent injury, and the balance of
the permanent total disability compensation is paid out of a "subsequent
' 29
injury fund."
A.

Cumulative Permanent PartialDisability

If a combination of injuries occurs that results in less than permanent
total disability, but some degree of permanent partial disability, section 851-106 does not apply. No apportionment is made, and the employer at the
time of the subsequent injury is liable for all of the resulting disability unless
an apportionment is possible under section 8-47-102 of the Act. 30 Assuming
the latter section provides inadequate relief for the employer, the employer is
in the unique and anomalous position of arguing, in tandem with the claimant, that the claimant's disability is total. Anything less would be an economically untenable position from the viewpoint of the employer.
An employer has no economic incentive to prove that his worker's disability can be reduced through some expensive vocational rehabilitation program for which the employer must pay under section 8-49-101.3' Further,
there is no economic incentive to rehire the employee after medical recovery,
either for the same job or for a position specially created to accommodate his
disabilities. Either course of action would defeat the employer's right to an
32
apportionment of compensation.
The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that the purpose of section 851-106 is to enhance the opportunities for employment of a partially diseither wholly or partially dependent upon the deceased, the employer or his insurance
carrier, if any, shall pay to the division the sum of fifteen thousand dollars to be deposited with the state treasurer, as custodian, into the subsequent injury fund. In the
event there are only partially dependent persons dependent upon the deceased, the
employer or his insurance carrier, if any, shall first pay such benefits to such partial
dependents and the balance of the sum of fifteen thousand dollars, to be deposited
with the state treasurer, as custodian, into the subsequent injury fund.
(2) If an employee entitled to additional benefits, as provided in this section,
obtains employment while receiving compensation from the subsequent injury fund,
he shall be compensated out of said fund at the rate of one-half of his average weekly
wage loss, subject to the maximum and ninimum provisions of the workmen's compensation act, during such period of employment.
(3) In case payment is or has been made under the provisions of this section and
dependency later is shown or if payment is made by mistake or inadvertence or under
such circumstances that justice requires a refund thereof, the division is authorized to
refund such payment to the employer or, if insured, his insurance carrier.
(4) The sums provided for the subsequent injury fund created by this section
shall be used to make such compensation payments as may be required by the provisions of articles 40 to 54 of this title.
29. Id § 8-51-106(1)(b).
30. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102 allows an apportionment only to the extent that any
prior partial disability still exists at the time of a subsequent partial injury. See notes 34-49 tn/a
and accompanying text discussing § 8-47-102.
31. CoLO.REV. STAT. § 8-49-101 (1973 & Supp. 1979), the medical benefits section of the
Act, provides for benefits up to $20,000 for medical expenses and vocational rehabilitation.
32. See id § 8-51-106(l)(a) (Supp. 1979).
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abled person by relieving his employer of an otherwise greater potential liability. 33 The statutory language, however, defeats its own raison d'&re
unless an employer, at the onset of employment, believes he can prove total
disability in the event of a subsequent industrial injury to the partially disabled person.
B.

Pre-exzti)ng Nonindustrial PartialDsabilh

Amendment of section 8-51-106 is necessary before the idealistic goal of
enhancing opportunities for employment of persons with prior medical conditions or handicaps may be attained in practice: the employer must be
accorded the protection of apportionment for injury to a worker who did not
have a prior ihdustrialdisability but instead had a pre-existing, symptomatic,
nonindustrial impairment known to the employer or even a pre-existing,
asymptomatic, nonindustrial impairment unknown to anyone at the time of
employment. Conditions involving aortic or vascular congestion, spinal osteoarthritis, scoliosis, or a cerebral vascual aneurism-either symptomatic or
asymptomatic-may not have caused any prior industrial disability. Nonetheless, such conditions may cause substantial physical impairment.
What happens when that worker suffers an aggravating or precipitating
on-the-job injury that renders him permanently and totally disabled because
of the cumulative effect of his pre-existing impairment and the subsequent
injury? His employer has no relief under section 8-51-106 for any apportionment of liability. The employer is fully responsible to the injured worker for
permanent total disability-an onerous burden to impose upon an employer
who has hired an employer with a pre-existing condition.
C.

Curing the Apportionment Inequities

The illogically limiting and restrictive language presumably did not intend the unequal results it has caused. An employer in reality, acting in his
own economic best interests, is reluctant to hire a handicapped worker. To
do so would be economic folly. The hiring of handicapped persons could be
encouraged if section 8-51-106 were amended to correct the illusory protection now offered to the employer. The purpose articulated by the court of
appeals will only be accomplished if the subsequent injury fund covers persons who become partially disabled as well as those who become totally disabled when a subsequent injury does occur.
If apportionment made the subsequent injury fund liable for the disabling effects resulting from all pre-existing medical conditions, regardless of
whether they were previously disabling or were industrially induced, an employer could take solace in the protection of the Act and hire a worker no
matter what his handicap or pre-existing condition. The employer would
only be liable for that portion of disability attributable to the subsequent
accident with the subsequent injury fund liable for that portion attributable
to the pre-existing condition.
33. Horizon Land Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 34 Colo. App. 178, 524 P.2d 638 (1974).
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PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY FROM CUMULATIVE PARTIAL
INDUSTRIAL INJURIES

A.

Apportionment of Permanent PartialDzsability

The only part of the Act that specifically treats a situation where a
permanent partialdisability results from a combined previous disability and
subsequent accidental injury is, strangely, under Article 47, which covers
earnings and wages, 34 whereas permanent disability benefits are contained
in Article 51, appropriately entitled "Accident Benefits." Section 8-47-102
provides that the total percentage of partial disability must be determined
first. The percentage of "the previous disability as it existed at the time of
the subsequent injury" 35 is then deducted. The employer pays the balance
representing the percentage of the disability attributable only to the subsequent injury.
This method of apportionment applies to permanent total disability as
well as permanent partial disability unless the apportionment provisions of
section 8-51-106 apply. The latter section will apply when total disability
results from a combined previous industrial disability and subsequent industrial disability. 36 In juxtaposition, the differing apportionment requirements
of section 8-47-102 and section 8-51-106 become clearer. Section 8-47-102
requires a previous disability to exist at the time of the subsequent injury.
Section 8-51-106 does not, by its language or interpretive case law, specifically require a prior disability to exist at the time of the subsequent injury.
It requires only that there be a "previously sustained permanent partial disability." Section 8-47-102 does not require the combined disabilities to produce permanent total disability. Section 8-51-106, however, does require the
prior and subsequent disablities to produce permanent total disability.
It is important to note that the apportionment made under section 8-47102 is solely of permanent disability benefits. There is no apportionment of
either medical expenses or temporary disability during medical convalescence. Hypothetically, if a person had five percent permanent partial disability remaining at the time of the subsequent injury, the subsequent
accident would be a separate event entitling the claimant to medical ex34. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102 (1973) generally sets forth the manner in which average
weekly earnings are to be calculated:
(1) The fact that an employee has suffered a previous disability or received compensation therefor shall not preclude compensation for a later injury or for death, but,
in determining compensation for the later injury or death, his average weekly earnings
shall be such sum as will reasonably represent his average weekly earning capacity at
the time of the later injury and shall be arrived at according to and subject to the
limitations in section 8-47-101.
(2) In case there is a previous disability, the percentage of disability for a subsequent injury shall be determined by computing the percentage of the entire disability
and deducting therefrom the percentage of the previous disability as it existed at the
time of the subsequent injury. In such cases awards shall be based on said computed
percentage. Such computation, when applicable, shall be made in the following types
of awards under articles 40 to 54 of this title: Permanent total, permanent partial,
including scheduled, working unit, and lump sum; except that, in the event the provisions of section 8-51-106 are applicable, such apportionment shall not be made.
35. Id § 8-47-102(2).
36. For a discussion of apportionment under § 8-51-106, see notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
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penses and temporary disability benefits while convalescing until such time
as he reached maximum medical improvement. Apportionment would then
be made of whatever residual permanent disability was sustained.
B.

Statutory Conditions to Apportionment

The apportionment allowed to the employer is illusory for two reasons.
First, it requires the existence of "a previous disability"; however, a "disability" has been interpreted by some case decisions to mean a loss of earning
capacity, not just a functional or physical impairment. 37 Second, the emloyer must establish by competent evidence what the previous disability was
"at the time of the subsequent injury."' 38 He is precluded from credit for any
previous disability awards that were made months or years prior to the subsequent injury if the worker ultimately recovered with only a residual functional or physiological impairment but no disability. 39 The subsequent
employer is liable for the entire disability without any apportionment if he
cannot prove that the worker's disability at the time of the subsequent injury
was the same as that for which compensation was awarded previously.
The burden placed upon the employer by the statutory prerequisites to
apportionment is evident from the landmark cases in which the Colorado
Supreme Court has reviewed and interpreted section 8-47-102.4 0 In Matthews v. Industrial Commission,4 1 the claimant had a congenital low back condition prior to the on-the-job accident but nonetheless was able to work as a
truck driver driving long distances and lifting 50-100 pound sacks of chemicals. His employment activities, according to his testimony, caused him no
discomfort. The Industrial Commission determined that the accident
caused 8% permanent disability and awarded the claimant 4%, finding that
4% pre-existed the accident. The supreme court reversed the Industrial
Commission and ordered the entire 8% paid to the claimant on the basis that
he was not industrially disabled from performing his work full time at full
pay prior to the accident. Even though the claimant admitted that the injury aggravated a pre-existing condition, the employer was held liable for
the entire degree of permanent impairment because the claimant's earning
capacity was not diminished by the pre-existing condition immediately prior
42
to the injury in dispute.
The supreme court made it very clear that the employer takes a worker
as he finds him with all of his impairments in Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. V.
Industrial Commission.43 The claimant had suffered three previous back injuries for which he had received three separate compensation awards. Al37. See, e.g., Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
38. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-47-102(2) (1973).

39. See Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Rhodes, 166 Colo. 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968); Empire
Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963).
40. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Rhodes, 166 Colo, 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968); Empire

Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963); Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 151 Colo. 18, 379 P.2d 153 (1962); Matthews v. Industrial Comm'n, 144
Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
41. 144 Colo. 146, 355 P.2d 300 (1960).
42. See id at 149-50, 355 P.2d at 301.
43. 151 Colo. 18, 379 P.2d 153 (1962).
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though he had been advised not to perform any heavy work after his third
injury, he was able to work full time at full wages before his fourth injury left
him permanently totally disabled. The court ruled that the employer was
44
not entitled to any apportionment on the basis of a pre-existing condition.
The court stressed the absence of any apportionment provisions in the
Act to cover this situation 45 -an omission rectified by amending section 851-106 to apportion permanent total disability. If a worker's disability by
chance is less than total, the employer would still be denied relief under the
rule articulated in Colorado Fuel and Iron.
The claimant's ability to work full time at full wages after a previous
industrial disability was determinative in a third supreme court case which
upheld a full award of disability benefits without any apportionment. 46 The
fact that the claimant had received compensation benefits for a prior permanent disability did not preclude an award of full benefits for the subsequent
injury because the employee "nevertheless, had fully recovered as a working
u n it .

47
'

The significance of the second condition in the statutory language of
section 8-47-102 was expressly stated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp. v. Rhodes. 4 8 The claimant in Rhodes had suffered a
previous back injury for which he was awarded permanent partial disability
benefits. He suffered a second back injury in 1964. Prior to the second injury he had returned to work full time at full wages. The Industrial Commission determined that 15% permanent partial disability existed after the
subsequent injury but limited the award to 7 1/2%. The supreme court held
that the entire 15% was owed to the claimant:
The fact that Claimant in 1955 received an award for permanent
partial disability based on a finding of 7 1/2% disability as a working unit, does not necessarily mean that such percentage of disability existed at the time of the subsequent injury. . . . And the
statutory test is that percentage of the previous disability existing
as of the time of the subsequent injury, not the percentage of previous disability as it existed some nine years- prior to the subsequent
49
injury.
The evidentiary requirements of section 8-47-102, as interpreted by the
court, virtually preclude any apportionment of benefits for successive injuries resulting in only permanent partial disability. If the legislature intended
a true apportionment, why did it not include, in favor of the employer, previous impairment---either industrial or nonindustrial-regardless of whether
the impairment prevented the employee from working full time at full wages
at the time of the subsequent injury?
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id at 26-27, 379 P.2d at 157-58.
Id at 26, 379 P.2d at 157.
Empire Oldsmobile, Inc. v. McLain, 151 Colo. 510, 379 P.2d 402 (1963).
Id at 516, 379 P.2d at 405.
166 Colo. 82, 441 P.2d 652 (1968).
Id at 88-89, 441 P.2d at 655.
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V.

PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY

The compensation rate for permanent total disability is set forth in section 8-51-107.50 This section also creates a rebuttable presumption that loss
of two hands or arms or feet or legs or eyes or a combination of5 any two thereof
caused by the same znJhit shall be permanent total disability. '
Again, the legislature has acted strangely. It included an almost idential anatomical pairing as itemized in the scheduled disability section 8-51104, but conspicuously omitted a presumption for deafness in both ears. In
addition, the loss of use of these body members is not included in the presumption of permanent total disability. Another inexplicable omission is the
absence of any provision for injury to the spinal column, brain, or trunk of
the body.
The employer is relieved from payment of permanent total disability if
he obtains "suitable employment" for the injured worker in spite of the presumption of total disability. 52 What type of job constitutes "suitable employment," however, is not defined by the statute. Further, even when
"suitable employment" is offered by the employer, section 8-51-107 provides
for an award of permanent partial disability to the claimant without any
guidance as to how or by what formula such partial disability is to be determined. Thus, there are no statutory standards by which any employer or
claimant may analyze the strengths and weaknesses of a particular claim
before a hearing on the merits. The courts have not supplied the missing
standards.
A.

General or Speqjci

Employment-Which is the Test?

In Rio GrandeMotor Way v. De Merschman,53 the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld an award of permanent total disability although the claimant was
given a supervisory position with the same employer at $125 per month (a
50% reduction from earnings prior to the accident). In doing so, the court
stated that "[w]hether degree of disability be determined from general impairment, or impairment of capacity to perform specic work, or both, depends upon the
facts of each case, and thereto the commission is vested with the 'widest possible
50. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-107(1) (1973) provides:
In cases of permanent total disability, the award shall be sixty-six and two-thirds
percent of the average weekly wages of the injured employee and shall continue until
death of such person so totally disabled but not in excess of the weekly maximum
benefits specified in this article for injuries causing temporary total disability.
51. The loss of both hands or both arms or both feet or both legs or both eyes or of any
two thereof, by injury in or resulting from the same injury or occupational disease,
shall create a presumption which may be rebutted by competent contrary evidence of
total and permanent disability to be compensated according to the provisions of this
section; except that, where the disability comes under this section and where the employer or the division obtains suitable employment for such disabled person which he
can perform and which in all cases is subject to the sole approval of the director, the
disabilities set out in this subsection (2) shall not constitute total disability during the
continuance of the director's approval of said employment but shall constitute such
partial disability as may be determined by the director after a finding of the facts.
Id § 8-51-107(2) (Supp. 1979).
52. Id.
53. 100 Colo. 421, 68 P.2d 446 (1937).
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discretion.' "4 The court, with only speculative and conjectural evidence at
best about the claimant's alleged industrial disability and loss of earning
capacity, obviously did not consider the supervisory position suitable alternative employment.
This employment appears to arise solely from the corporation's recognition of a "moral responsibility," plus the influence of its president, claimant's brother. . . . We think the conclusion inevitable
that it has no relation to earning power, that it is in fact charitable,
a mere gratuity, which in all probability would vanish with the
death, disability, or discharge of 55the brother, leaving claimant
mere flotsam on the industrial sea.
Only three years after De Merschman, the court held that the test of permanent disability is lost earning capacity in generalemployment and is not re56
stricted to the type ofjob the employee performed at the time of the injury.
The claimant was a forty-two year old coal miner with a seventh grade education and no training in any work other than mining. He suffered a low
back injury for which he was awarded sixty percent permanent partial disability. On appeal by the claimant, the supreme court affirmed the partial
disability award, primarily on the basis of one doctor's opinion of the claimant's future ability to work in some field of general employment. 57 The record was barren of any evidence the claimant could return to coal miningan irrelevant fact under the test articulated by the court. Equally irrelevant
were percentages of functional or medical impairment:
The functional disability of an injured workman, compared with
that of a normal man, does not control in fixing his compensable
status, since the term "disability" as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act, means industrial disability or loss of earning capacity and not mere functional disability. . . . [Tihere was evidence
that claimant retained or would regain efficiency in some substantial degree as a working unit in the fields of general employment ...
It may further be observed that neither under the applicable
statutes nor any cases adjudicated prior to or since their amendment to the present state, is the extent or degree of disability solely
to be determined by the claimant's impaired earning capcaity as it
relates to the kind of labor in which he was employed when in58
jured.
The supreme court did not follow its own general employment rule in
54. Id at 423, 68 P.2d at 447 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The claimant had been
burned in an explosion and could no longer perform his work as a master mechanic. Doctors
estimated his disability at 65-100%. He had no special training or skill for other work.
55. Id, 68 P.2d at 447.
56. Byouk v. Industrial Comm'n, 106 Colo. 430, 433-34, 105 P.2d 1087, 1089. (1940).
57. Seven doctors examined the claimant: three for the claimant, two for the employer,
and two for the Industrial Commission. Two of the claimant's doctors thought he was
permanently tozall.y disabled; but one, fixing no percentage of disability, testified that the claimant would be able to do ordinary labor in the future. His testimony appeared to be determinative. The employer's doctors varied in their estimates of the claimant's disability: one set the
percentage between 25-30%; the other, at 62 1/2%. Estimates by the Commission's doctors
ranged from 50-60%. Id at 433, 105 P.2d at 1088-89.
58. Id at 433-34, 105 P.2d at 1089 (citations omitted).
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NationalFuel Co. v. Arnold.59 The claimant, a twenty-five year old coal miner,
suffered a back and pelvis injury that residually left his feet paralyzed, requiring canes or crutches to walk. Nevertheless, the claimant managed to
complete a typewriting course at Opportunity School in Denver and subsequently worked as a clerk, bookkeeper, and cook. The supreme court held
that these jobs in fields of general employment did not reduce his permanent
total disability just because "this most unfortunate young man, who, persevering to the utmost, has at times, and under unusual circumstances, been
able to obtain some employment. . . ,,60 Further, the supreme court emphasized that the claimant had obtained the jobs himself. Because the employer had played no part in obtaining jobs for the claimant, the court did
not believe the employer was "in a position to complain" that the claimant
61
had been able to do so on his own initiative.
Wage-earning capacity was discarded as a test for determining permanent total disability in New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission.6 2 The
claimant was a twenty-four year old zinc miner with a ninth grade education
who injured his spinal cord in a mine accident. He lost control over his
bowel and urine functions and lost total feeling in the perirectal region. The
referee interpreted these injuries as a purely functional disability, but the
Commission awarded permanent total disability. The supreme court remarked that the claimant performed other jobs after his medical recovery,
but did not bother to enumerate them. It simply stated that "[o]ne able to
obtain occasional employment under rare conditions and at small remunera'6 3
tion may be totally disabled for all practicable purposes."
B.

The "Widest Possible Discretion" Rule

The only consistent rule which emerges from the cases on permanent
total disability is that " '[ilt is axiomatic that the Industrial Commission is
vested with the widest possible discretion with the exercise of which the
courts will not interfere.' ",64 Where the Act vests the Commission with discretionary power, the courts will not overrule "the exercise of that discretion
unless there is a clear showing of an abuse thereof."'6 5
In the NewJersey Znc Co. case, the supreme court relied on the Commission's exercise of discretion in awarding permanent total disability in spite of
conflicting medical evidence. Two doctors had testified that the claimant
was totally unemployable as a hard rock miner; other doctors testified that
the claimant suffered only fifty percent permanent partial disability. The
court laid to rest anyone's idea that medical opinions or any expert opinions
59.

121 Colo. 220, 214 P.2d 784 (1950).

60. Id. at 226, 214 P.2d at 787.
61. Id at 227, 214 P.2d at 787.
62. 165 Colo. 482, 440 P.2d 284 (1968).
63. Id at 486, 440 P.2d at 286.
64. National Fuel Co. v. Arnold, 121 Colo. 220, 226, 214 P.2d 784, 787 (1950) (citations
omitted); New Jersey Zinc Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 165 Colo. 482, 440 P.2d 284 (1968); Rio
Grande Motor Way v. De Merschman, 100 Colo, 421, 68 P.2d 446 (1937); F.W. Woolworth Co.
v. Humes, 523 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication).
65. Industrial Comm'n v. Seastone, 167 Colo. 571, 576, 448 P.2d 963, 965 (1969).
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bind the Industrial Commission on the issue of permanent disability:
"[Elven if the expert testimony 'were undisputed, it would not necessarily be
'
concusive on the fact-finding body'-the Commission. "66
The issue in F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Hiumes 6 7 was whether an award of
permanent total disability could be made without an opportunity for the
employer to introduce evidence concerning the percentage of the claimant's
disability. Two doctors had testified that the claimant was totally permanently disabled although the question of the degree of disability was technically not at issue during the original hearings. Conflicting medical
testimony had also been given. No mention had been made of the claimant's
earning capacity nor any other test for permanent total disability. The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld the award of permanent total disability benefits by invoking the "widest possible discretion" rule. 68
Using "widest possible discretion" as the test, it would seem that even a
whim could be the basis of an award for permanent total disability just so
long as there is some testimony or exhibit properly admitted into evidence.
The decision then becomes a matter of what weight the referee gives the
evidence however meager. Our appellate courts have persistently reiterated
that they will not substitute their judgment for the referee's.
C.

Exercising Discretion

Pragmatically, the discretionary language of the Act and the case law
place the referee in an unusually difficult position whenever a case requires
evaluation of a substantial permanent disability. The difficulty arises because Colorado does not have a pure permanent partial disability statute;
ie., the Colorado Act does not provide for an award of benefits over the
claimant's life expectancy based purely on the degree of permanent impairment. Instead, there is a statutory dollar limit of $26,292 for permanent
partial disability which places a ceiling on the amount of benefits payable in
spite of the degree of disability and the life expectancy of the injured
69
worker.
There is a substantial disparity between permanent partial disability
and permanent total disability benefits. Permanent partial disability is currently paid at a rate of $84 per week, subject to the $26,292 limit; but permanent total disability is paid at a higher rate without any ceiling on the total
amount payable. The latter rate is the same as compensation for temporary
total disability, two-thirds of a worker's average weekly rate not to exceed
$222.74 per week. 70 A worker must earn $334.11 per week to qualify for the
71
maximum weekly rate of $222.74.
Hypothetically, if a worker were 21 years of age at the time of an injury,
66.

165 Colo. 482, 486, 440 P.2d 284, 286 (1968).

67. 523 P.2d 143 (Colo. App. 1974) (not selected for official publication).
68. d at 144.
69. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 8-51-108(a) (b) (Supp. 1979). For the text of the permanent partial disability provisions, see note 73 infra.
70. From July 1, 1979 through June 30, 1980, $222.74 is the maximum rate for both tem-

porary total and permanent total disability. See Appendix IV infra.
71. See Appendices IV, V ifia.
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he would have a life expectancy of 52.07 years. A 1% partial disability
would amount to a maximum award of $2,274.42.72 A permanent partial
disability rating of only 11 1/2% would bring the worker to the maximum
limit of $26,292. In contrast, if the same worker, earning $334.11 per week,
were determined to be permanently totally disabled, he would receive
$603,099.73 total compensation ($222.74 per week times 52.07 years life exsocial security
pectancy without the benefit of any offset or reduction for
73
disability benefits or any other allowable statutory offset).
What happens, practically speaking, when a referee is faced with a serious injury that results in a substantial degree of permanent disability clearly
exceeding 11 1/2% by any standard? The referee would probably calculate
the various sets of rating figures and anguish whether to award the worker
permanent total disability. In accordance with governing case law, he is
vested with the "widest possible discretion" should he choose to award permanent total disability. In that regard, it has been stated by the supreme
court that it is not necessary for a worker to have sustained a "helpless paralysis reducing bodily functions to the minimum essential for the maintenance
of a mere spark of life." ' 74 Claimant and respondent alike are painfully
aware of the shocking disparity in the two possible awards and of the conundrum facing the referee: whether he should award permanent total disability or maximum permanent partial disability. Either award is unfair, but no
intermediate award is allowed by the Act.
VI.

PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY

The statutory provisions for permanent partial disability are set forth in
section 8-51-108 of the Act. 75 This section excludes from consideration as
72. Ser Appendices, I,IIinfa.
73.

CoLO.REV. STAT. § 8-51-107(1) (1973).

74. New York Indemn. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 86 Colo. 364, 366, 281 P.2d 740, 741
(1929).
75. CoLO.REV. STAT. § 8-51-108 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
(1)(a) Where an accident causes injury resulting in permanent partial disability,
except the sustaining of any one of the injuries specifically covered by sections 8-51104 to 8-51-106, the injured employee shall be deemed permanently disabled from the
time he is so declared by the director and from said time shall be entitled to compensation for permanent partial disability in addition to any compensation theretofore allowed.
(b) In determining permanent partial disability, the director shall ascertain in
terms of percentage the extent of general permanent disability which the injury has
caused, taking into consideration not only the manifest weight of the evidence but also
the general physical condition and mental training, ability, former employment, and
education of the injured employee. The director shall then determine the injured employee's expectancy of life from recognized expectancy tables and such other evidence
relating to his expectancy as may be presented, but in no event shall the employee's
life expectancy be reduced for these purposes if his injury or illness is the direct cause
of his reduced life expectancy. He shall then ascertain the total amount which said
employee would receive during the balance of his expectancy at the compensaton rate
of eighty-four dollars per week and shall then take that percentage of the total sum so
arrived at as is indicated by the percentage of general permanent disability found to
exist in the manner as set forth in this article, not to exceed in any event the aggregate
sum of twenty-six thousand two hundred ninety-two dollars, said sum to be paid at a
weekly rate of not more than eighty-four dollars.
(2) At any time, and from time to time, during the period for which compensation has been awarded for either permanent total or permanent partial disability,
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permanent partial disability any injury specifically covered by sections 8-51104 through 8-51-106. Section 8-51-108 thus effectively precludes any (1)
scheduled disability under section 8-51-104(7) after a referee has exercised
his discretion and made an award under that section, 76 (2) facial or bodily
disfigurement which has been awarded by the director under section 8-5177
105, or (3) permanent total disability which has been awarded under section 8-51-106 or section 8-51-107. 7 8 Because of the exclusionary language,
the Colorado Supreme Court has held that the 'method for determining benefits for an injury under any one of those sections cannot be the same
79
formula as set forth in section 8-51-108(1)(b).
A.

When Does Permanent PartialDisability Commence?

Under section 8-51-108(1)(a), permanent partial disability commences
at the time the director declares that a worker is permanently partially disabled. The date is purely discretionary with the director since no specific
time is legislatively prescribed. 8' Sequentially, permanent partial disability
generally follows a period of temporary total disability; therefore, the director's discretion is very significant because of the wide disparity between the
weekly rate for permanent partial disability and the maximum weekly rate
for temporary total disability ($84.00 and $222.74 respectively from July 1,
1979 through June 30, 1980). It is to the employer's benefit for the commencement date to be set as early as possible. As a result, insurers contend
that the commencement date should be the earliest of (1) the date of maximum medical improvement, (2) the date the claimant actually returns to
work, (3) the date the claimant was able to return to work in the opinion of a
treating or examining physician, or (4) the date of the first rating of permanent physical or functional impairment given by a physician. The claimant,
of course, maximizes his benefits-by arguing for the latest possible permanent
partial disability commencement date. One case has held that the commencement date is when the claimant reaches maximum medical improvement. 8 1
B.

Permanent PartialDisability after Permanent Total Disabihty
If a claimant qualifies for permanent partial disability benefits, then

upon application of any party in interest, the director shall require such injured employee to be examined by one or more physicians, and, upon petition from any such
interested party supported by a showing that the disability of such injured employee
has undergone a change in degree since the entry of such award, the case shall be
reopened, and the compensation previously awarded shall be modified, terminated, or
continued as the evidence may require.
76. For a discussion of the referee's discretion under § 8-51-104(7), see the text accompanying notes 15-23 supra.
77. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
78. For a discussion of§ 8-51-106, see the text accompanying notes 28-33 supra. Section 851-107 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 50-73 supra.
79. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Tupper, 152 Colo. 12, 380 P.2d 31 (1963); Arkin v. Industrial Comm'n, 145 Colo. 463, 358 P.2d 879 (1961).
80. Wilson v. Sinclaire, 109 Colo. 592, 128 P.2d 996 (1942).
81. Pickett v. Colorado State Hosp., 32 Colo. App. 282, 513 P.2d 228 (1973).
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such benefits are "in addition to any compensation" previously awarded.8 2
In other words, the benefits provided under section 8-51-108 are not to be
reduced by payment of any other benefits. For example, permanent partial
disability benefits would not be reduced by payments made for a preceding
period of temporary total disability. The claimant can receive the $26,292
aggregate limitation on permanent partial disability benefits8 3 without regard to temporary total disability compensation received.
What happens if a worker had been awarded permanent total disability
benefits for an injury and his condition dramatically improved with ongoing
treatment, so that he could return to work at gainful employment? Under
section 8-51-108(2), any interested party may petition to reopen the case if
there has been a change in the degree of disability.8 4 If the requisite showing
of changed conditions is met, the director must reopen the case for modification, termination, or continuance of the award. 85 Alternatively, under section 8-53-119, the claimant, his representative, an employer, or an insurer
has the right to petition to reopen the case at-any time within six years from
the date of the injury or within two years from the date the last compensation payment becomes due and payable.8 6 Under the latter section, reopening the case is discretionary with the director. If the case is reopened under
section 8-53-119, however, the director may consider termination, diminution, continuance, or increase in compensation and medical benefits. 8 7 The
difference in language is inexplicable. Was it the result of negligent drafting
or intentional? If purposeful, the legislative intent remains hidden. Note
that the two sections are not cross-referenced to the statute despite dealing
with the same subject matter of procedures for reopening claims.
If a determination is made that permanent total disability no longer
exists, payment for such disability is discontinued. Any new award made for
permanent partial disability would be paid in addition to benefits previously
paid for total disability; ie., without credit or reduction for permanent total
disability benefits previously paid. Significantly, however, the permanent
partial disability benefits would be paid at the lower rate of $84 per week
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

CoLo. REV. STAT, § 8-51-108(1)(a) (1973).
Id. § 8-51-108(1)(b)(Supp. 1979).
Id § 8-51-108(2) (1973). See note 75 supra for the text of the statute.
Id
CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-53-119 (Supp. 1979).
Upon his own motion on the ground of error, mistake, or a change in condition,
the director, at any time within six years from the date of injury in cases where no
compensation has been paid, or at any time within two years after the date last payment becomes due and payable, or within six years from the date of injury, whichever
is longer, in cases where compensation has been paid, and after notice of hearing to the
parties interested, may review and reopen any award and, on such review, may make
an award ending, diminishing, maintaining, or increasing compensation and any medical benefits previously awarded, subject to the maximum and minimum provided in
articles 40 to 54 of this title, and shall state his conclusions of fact and rulings of law,
and shall immediately send to the parties a copy of the award. No such review or
reopening shall affect such award as regards any moneys already paid. The director
shall grant or deny a request filed by any interested party asking that the case be
reopened under this section and shall state his reasons therefor. Any such order or
award made by the director shall be subject to review by the commission.
87 Id

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:4

and would terminate after a specified period when the statutory limit was
met.
C.

The Test for Permanent PartialDisability

Section 8-51-108(l)(b) requires the director, in awarding permanent
partial disability, to determine the percentage of a worker's "generalpermanent
disabih which the injury has caused" and mandates factors for him to consider, which are "not only the manifest weight of the evidence but also the
general physical condition and mental training, ability, former employment,
and education of the injured employer."
1.

Loss of Earning Capacity or Functional Impairment?

Although the statute refers to "general permanent disability," the
proper test for permanent partial disability has not been definitively determined. The crucial, polemic issue is whether permanent partial disability
should (1) indemnify a functional impairment caused by an industrial injury
(akin to personal injury in a common law tort case) or (2) reimburse a claimant for loss of wage-earning capacity caused by an industrial injury. The
polarization of the differing philosophies when applied to interpretation of
permanent partial disability under section 8-51-108 was articulated in two
88
recent Colorado cases.
In Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano,89 the court of appeals affirmed an
award of one percent permanent partial disability for surgical removal of the
claimant's left testicle and left and right epidymides. 90 The claimant, in the
process of unloading box cars, had aggravated a pre-existing groin infection
which eventually necessitated the surgery. Following medical treatment, the
claimant stated that he was afraid to try lifting heavy objects. At the hearing, no evidence of any loss of earning capacity was introduced. The only
medical opinion, by the treating physician, established functional impairment at best: " '[H]e has one less testicle, and I am not sure that would be of
any consequence other than how he feels about it, ...
from an emotional standpoint.' ,91
The majority opinion of the court of appeals stated that loss of physical
function, despite no loss of earning capacity, is a proper basis for an award of
permanent partial disability: "'"The term 'disability' is not restricted to
• . .[impairment of] present earning power. . . , but embraces any loss of
physical function which detracts from the former efficiency of the body or its
'.92
members in the ordinar, pursuits of life."
The effect of the majority opinion was to treat permanent partial disa88. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978); Puffer
Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974), rev'd, 190 Colo. 138, 546
P.2d 481 (1975).
89. 34 Colo. App. 434, 528 P.2d 966 (1974), rev'd, 190 Colo. 138, 546 P.2d 481 (1975).
90. The epidymides are elongated cord-like structures in which spermatozoa are stored
after being produced in the testicles.
91. 34 Colo. App. at 437, 528 P.2d at 967 (emphasis supplied by the court).
92. Id, 528 P.2d at 968 (emphasis supplied by the court) (quoting London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 70 Colo. 256, 258-59, 199 P. 962, 963 (1921)).
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bility awards like personal injury damages in tort cases since the claimant
could be working full time at full wages when he received the award. In
essence, the Puffer majority interpreted section 8-51-108 as compensation for
functional impairment alone.
Judge VanCise delivered a scathing dissent in which he contended that
no permanent partial disability should have been awarded. His rationale
was that the Colorado Workmen's Compensation Act is not based upon
"whole-man impairment" but rather was enacted to compensate for loss of
earning capacity. Judge VanCise agreed with the majority that the Act is to
be liberally construed to accomplish a beneficent social and protective purpose but added that the court cannot extent the Act beyond the limits of its
purposes. He admonished that the London Guarantee case relied on by the
majority involved a worker unable to protractedly perform physical exertion
without many rest periods during his working hours. 9 3 He then pointed out
the substantial distinctions between the "whole-man theory" and the "working unit theory" of compensation.
"In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated
for are those which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning power. For this reason classes of injuries which result
in verdicts of thousands of dollars at common law produce no
award whatever under a compensation statute. . . . Similarly, impairment or destruction of sexual potency is not in itself a basis for
an award, and presumably the same result would apply to such an
' 94
injury as destruction of child-bearing capacity in a woman."
"[A]ny abandonment of the pervading impairment-of-earning
capacity concept in favor of an ill-defined notion that workmen's
compensation is designed to indemnify for physical injury as such
could raise serious dangers to the system. One danger stems from
the utter absence of any yardstick by which to measure in dollars
the intrinsic value of individual functions of different parts of the
body to different persons ....
A familiar practical danger lies in the tendency for the wholeman theory to turn imperceptibly into the less elegant 'let's-givethe-poor-guy-something' theory. The end of this road is the kind of
situation. . . in which a grotesque proportion of the compensation
benefit dollar is frittered away on trivial awards of, perhaps, 2
1/2% disability . . . awards that bear no conceivable relation to
the real purpose of workmen's compensation, that of protecting the
' 95
victims of industrial injury from insecurity and dependence.
Noting Judge VanCise's dissenting opinion, the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case with directions to
deny the award. 96 In its short, cryptic opinion, the court pointed out that
93. 34 Colo. App. at 440, 528 P.2d at 969 (VanCise, J., dissenting).
94. Id at 441, 528 P.2d at 969 (VanCise, J., dissenting) (quoting I A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATON LAW § 2.40).

95. 34 Colo. App. at 441, 528 P.2d at 970 (Van Cise, J., dissenting) (quoting 2 A. LARSON,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 57.10).

96. Puffer Mercantile Co. v. Arellano, 190 Colo. 138, 546 P.2d 481 (1975).
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the record did not "support a finding of industrial disability or loss of earn'9 7
ing capacity, as distinct from a mere functional disability."
The implication of the supreme court's decision in Pufr was that the
discretion given to the director in section 8-51-108 to award permanent partial disability must be narrowed to evidence of a wage-earning loss of capacity. The case left several questions unanswered, however. Must a
percentage of wage-earning loss of capacity apply as the measure of permanent partial disability? Or, once a percentage loss of earning capacity is
established, is discretion then returned to the director or referee to award
some percentage of "general permanent disability," as stated in section 8-51108, based upon any evidence that the claimant can produce of any of the
enumerated factors bearing upon permanent partial disability? Or, can a
director or referee award some percentage of "general permanent disability"
based upon a vague notion of what effect the injury has had on the worker,
even if the worker produces no proof of any of the enumerated factors? If
some percentage loss in earning capacity is merely the threshold requirement
for a compensable injury, then evidence of a minimal loss of earning capacity may support a substantial award of permanent partial disability based on
general functional impairment.
The subsequent case of American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros98 further
confused the issue of whether permanent partial disability represents wholeman impairment or working-unit disability. It also confused the requirement that a worker prove his claim for permanent partial disability. In the
AMAX case an underground miner suffered an arm injury. During the
medical examination for that injury, a routine chest x-ray revealed early
symptoms of mild silicosis. A medical examiner recommended that the
claimant not return to underground mine work because of the distinct danger of exacerbating the silicosis. The claimant did return to work for the
same employer as a janitor. He then filed for permanent partial disability
benefits for an occupational disease. 99 He proved that his wage as an undergound miner would have been $5.53 per hour at the time he was medically able to return to work but that his janitor's wage was only $4.42 per
hour, a 17% wage loss. He was forty-five years old and had worked as a
miner most of his adult life, including nine years employment with American Metals Climax, Inc. The Industrial Commission awarded the claimant
17% permanent partial disability.
After stating the test for permanent partial disability in terms of industrial disability or loss of earning capacity, the court of appeals held that "the
Industrial Commission's use of claimant's wage loss as the best measure of
97. Id at 139, 546 P.2d at 482 (citations omitted).
98. 39 Colo. App. 560, 571 P.2d 315 (1977), afd, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978)
[hereinafter referred to as AMAX].
99. Although the claim was brought under the Occupational Disease Disability Act, the
court of appeals cited the Puffer case as authority for the true test of permanent partial disability. 39 Colo. App. at 562, 571 P.2d at 317. Thus the cases are relevant to understanding § 8-51108 of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Occupational Disease Disability Act was repealed September 1, 1975; however, occupational diseases are now subject to the provisions of
the Workmen's Compenation Act. COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).
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his industrial disability did not constitute an abuse of discretion."' 0 0 The
supreme court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. 1° 1 Unfortunately, it
did not state that percentage loss of wage-earning capacity must be the test
when the issue is permanent partial disability. It merely approved the referee's exercise of his limitless discretion under section 8-51-108. The supreme
court simply adopted loss of wage-earning capacity as a test if the referee
chose to select it as the standard in a particular case. Justice Erickson, writing for the court, stated that "[a] compensable disability under the statute
requires a finding that the claimant has suffered an industrial disability or a
loss of earning capacity."'10 2 His reiteration of the "widest possible discretion" maxim, 10 3 however, begs the question of whether the referee may ignore evidence about loss of earning capacity.
The parameters of this discretion are still not defined, but at the very
least an award will not be overturned if wage-earning loss of capacity is the
basis for such award. It is regretful that the language could not have been
more forceful in frankly stating that wage-earning loss of capacity shall be
the test for awarding permanent partial disability. As a result, no one can
truly gauge the effects of this decision on other industrial injuries where the
issue is permanent partial disability. Earlier cases interpreting permanent
10 4
partial disability under the Act may still retain viability.
2.

Factors to be Considered by the Referee

Although section 8-51-108(l)(b) enumerates factors for a referee to consider, to what degree these factors are in fact considered is academic. There
is a judicial presumption that the presiding referee considered each one of
them and gave it due weight in arriving at his determination of permanent
partial disability. 10 5 Furthermore, the factors are not conditions precedent
to proof of a compensable permanent partial disability claim.
The statutory factors are not exclusive, but are merely illustrative
of the types of evidence which are relevant to the issues before the
commission. . . . [L]ack of evidence as to any of the statutory factors does not automatically mandate the dismissal of an employee's
claim. If the commission can reasonably conclude from the evidence that the claimant has suffered a compensable disability and
..
an
can also reasonably determine the extent of that disability,
10 6
award is justified and will be upheld on appeal.
The burden of proof is theoretically on the worker to establish his permanent partial disability, but the claimant apparently only needs to establish two things: (1) the existence of the disability, and (2) the extent
100. 39 Colo. App. at 563, 571 P.2d at 318 (citations omitted).
101. 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978).
102. Id at 166, 576 P.2d at 556 (citations omitted).

103. Id., 576 P.2d at 556.
104. Simpson & Co. v. Wheeler, 153 Colo. 480, 386 P.2d 976 (1963) (working-unit disability); Industrial Comm'n v. Vigil, 150 Colo. 356, 373 P.2d 308 (1962) (working-unit disability);
Wierman v. Tunnell, 108 Colo. 544, 120 P.2d 638 (1941) (whole-man impairment).
105. American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978); Dravo
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977).
106. 195 Colo. at 167, 576 P.2d at 557.
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thereof. 10 7 The claimant does not have to prove that jobs at comparable
wages are unavilable to him; the burden is on the respondent to prove availability of work which the claimant can perform in order to rebut either the
08
Evidence of available
existence or the extent of the claimant's disability.'
work is relevant, but it is not required. Such evidence is "merely an additional factor which the commission must consider in reaching its decision if
such evidence is in fact submitted."109
The "mereness" of available work seems strange since it would appear
that evidence of available work would be the best evidence of "industrial
disability or a loss of earning capacity," which was articulated as the proper
1
test for permanent partial disability in the AMAA case. 0 If the statutory
factors are merely "illustrative" and the Industrial Commission has the
"widest possible discretion," then it seems that a claimant need introduce
nothing more than a medical opinion that he has suffered a permanent physical or mental injury in order to be awarded permanent partial disability
benefits under section 8-51-108.
This conclusion is supported by the Colorado Court of Appeals decision
1
in Dravo Corp. v. IndustrialCommisson,"' which upheld an award of 25% permanent partial disability based upon a doctor's estimate of 25% anatomical
disability rather than industrial disability. The claimant had suffered a
mycoardial infarction while shoring timber to support the roof of a mine
tunnel. In the doctor's opinion, the anatomical loss of heart muscle created
an inherent risk of a future attack. Consequently, the claimant had suffered
an irreversible efect as a result of the heart attack. The referee specifically
adopted the cardiologist's opinion as a basis for the award of permanent
partial disability. The court of appeals considered anatomical disability a
relevant factor, useful as a guideline for determining the percentage of permanent industrial disability." 2 The court was not concerned about the coincidence between the cardiologist's estimate of 25% anatomical disability
and the 25% permanent partial disability award even though the referee did
not expressly consider any of the statutory factors in his findings of fact. The
court sidestepped the issue of a claimant's ability to satisfy his burden of
proof with mere medical opinion by invoking the judicial presumption that
13
the referee considered all of the statutory factors."
The award in Dravo compensated the claimant for loss offuture earnings
14
An award
without any evidence of a present loss of earning capacity.
based upon present disability would have been far more compatible with the
concept of working-unit disability than a speculative award of what might
become. If a heart attack in fact occurred later as a result of a worsening
107.
108.
(1977),
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id at 167-68, 576 P.2d at 557-58.
American Metals Climax, Inc. v. Cisneros, 39 Colo. App. 560, 563, 571 P.2d 315, 318
a~fd, 195 Colo. 163, 576 P.2d 553 (1978).
195 Colo. at 168, 576 P.2d at 558 (emphasis added).
Id at 166, 576 P.2d at 556.
40 Colo. App. 57, 569 P.2d 345 (1977).
Id at 60, 569 P.2d at 348.
Id at 60-61, 569 P.2d at 348.
Id at 59-60, 569 P.2d at 347-48.
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condition traceable to the on-the-job injury, the case could be reopened
upon petition of the claimant under section 8-53-119, assuming the time limitations of that section were met.115
After the referee has determined the percentage of disability, section 851-108(l)(b) requires the director to "determine the injured employee's expectancy of life from recognized expectancy tables and such other evidence
. . . as may be presented, but in no event shall the employee's life expectancy be reduced for these purposes if his injury or illness is the direct cause
of his reduced life expectancy." The legislature has codified a mortality table to use for purposes of determining life expectancy;' 16 however, it is not
mandatory for the Division of Labor to use this mortality table. 1 7 The table is merely evidence which may be considered in conjunction with any
other evidence of the claimant's life expectancy or may be disregarded entirely. 118
The director's discretion with respect to the mortality table becomes
significant if the true test of permanent partial disability is a working-unit
disability or loss of earning capacity. Under this type of test, the 1ndustrial
life expectancy of the injured worker may be the relevant time frame upon
which benefits are based. The employer or insurer could establish industrial
life expectancy through (1) testimony or exhibits reflecting an industry-wide
life expectancy or (2) evidence from a specific employer on the remaining
years that the worker could be employed with that employer or (3) a medical
opinion of the remaining reasonably expected productive working years of a
claimant in his particular occupation. Because the statute mandates that a
worker's life expectancy cannot be reduced by the effects of his injury or
illness, evidence of industrial life expectancy would have to assume the
worker was either healthy or that his life expectancy was diminished by
other systemic conditions not related to the injury or illness in question.
The life expectancy of an injured worker must be measured as of the
date that his permanent partial disability is determined and not the date
that he was injured." 9 Use of the later date may result in a higher award of
incremental benefits if revised mortality tables have been adopted between
the date of the injury and the date of determination of permanent partial
disability. The present mortality table approved by the Colorado legislature
contains a longer life span than previous tables. A longer life span is equated
to more money per segment of one percent disability than a shorter life span.
When multiple awards of permanent partial disability are made at different dates, the additional or reduced disability is required to be based
upon the worker's age on the date when the supplemental award was entered and not his age at the time of an earlier award. 120 Assuming the same
115. The text of § 8-53-119 is set forth in full in note 86 supra.
116. The Division of Labor is presently using the mortality tables set forth in COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-25-13 (Supp. 1979), which became effective on July 1, 1977. The table is reproduced
in Appendix I infra.
117. Colorado Fuel & Iron Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 148 Colo. 557, 367 P.2d 597 (1961).
118. Id at 559-60, 367 P.2d at 598.
119. Id at 558-60, 367 P.2d at 598-99.
120. Lefkaras v. Moffat Coal Co., 113 Colo. 416, 158 P.2d 386 (1945).
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mortality table is effective throughout the duration of the claimant's case,
the result would be a decrease in the incremental benefits paid to the worker
because the value of each one percent disability segment diminishes as a
21
claimant grows older.'
VII.

LAST EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASES

On September 1, 1975, the Occupation Disease Disability Act was repealed. Concurrently section 8-51-112 was enacted to provide coverage for
occupational diseases under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 122 Additional amendments were made to include occupational disease within the
definitions of "accident" and "injury" in section 8-41-108(2)123 and to specifically define "occupational disease."' 124 For a disease to be compensable
under the Act, certain criteria must be met. The disease must result
directly from the employment of the conditions under which work
was performed, which can be seen to have followed as a natural
incident of the work and as a result of the exposure occasioned by
the nature of the employment, and which can be fairly traced to
the employment as a proximate cause and which does not come
from a hazard to which the worker25 would have been equally exposed outside of the employment.1
Once an occupational disease has been found to be compensable, all the
provisions in the Act for permanent disability would seem to apply equally
to occupational diseases and accidental injuries.126 Section 8-51-112, how121.
122.

See Appendix I infra.
CoLo.REV. STAT. § 8-51-112 (Supp. 1979).
(1)Where compensation is payable for an occupational disease, the employer in
whose employment the employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such
disease and the insurance carrier, if any, on the risk when such employee was last so
exposed under such employer shall alone be liable therefor, without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier. In the case of silicosis, asbestosis, or
anthracosis, the only employer and insurance carrier liable shall be the last employer
in whose employment the employee was last exposed to harmful quantities of silicon
dioxide (SiO2) dust, asbestos dust, or coal dust on each of at least sixty days or more
and the insurance carrier, if any on the risk when the employee was last so exposed
under such employer.
(2) In any case where an employee of an employer becomes disabled from silicosis, asbestosis, anthracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive
materials, substances, or machines or to fissionable materials, or any type of malignancy caused thereby, or in the event death results from silicosis, asbestosis, anthracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by exposure to radioactive materials,
substances or machines or to fissionable materials, or any type of malignancy caused
thereby, and, if such employee has been injuriously exposed to such diseases while in
the employ of another employer during his lifetime, the last employer or his insurance
carrier, if any, shall be liable only for compensation and medical benefits as provided
by articles 40 to 54 of this title, including funeral expenses and death benefits, up to
the amount of ten thousand dollars. In addition to such benefits, such employee or, in
the event of death, his dependents shall receive additional benefits equivalent to the
difference between the amount paid by the last employer or his insurance carrier, if
any, and the total amount of benefits payable under said articles. Such additional
benefits shall be paid out of the subsequent injury fund created by the provisions of
section 8-51-106.
123. Id § 8-41-108(2) (Supp. 1979).
124. Id § 8-41-108(3).
125. Id
126. See id § 8-47-102 (1973) (effect of prior disabilities), § 8-51-104 (1973) (scheduled disability), § 8-51-105 (Supp. 1979) (facial or bodily disfigurement), § 8-51-106 (1973) (loss of re-
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ever, follows all permanent disability provisions in the Act and includes
unique provisions for occupational diseases. For example, the last employer
alone is liable for occupational disease benefits "without right to contribution from any prior employer or insurance carrier."' 127 This language apparently overrides the apportionment provisions for cumulative permanent
partial or permanent total disability under section 8-47-102 and 8-51-106
respectively.' 2 8 If so, section 8-51-112 discriminates harshly against the last
employer as compared with employers of accidentally injured workers.
There is a limited exception to the last employer rule. Apportionment
is allowed between the last employer and the subsequent injury fund if compensation and medical benefits exceed $10,000 and if the disease just happens to be "silicosis, asbestosis, anthracosis, or poisoning or disease caused by
exposure to radioactive materials, substances, or machines or fissionable
materials, or any type of malignancy caused thereby."' 129 In such cases, all
benefits over $10,000 are paid by the subsequent injury fund.
The puzzling, harsh, and questionably punitive treatment of employers
under section 8-51-112 is reflected in the recent cases of Union Carbide Corp. v.
Industrial Commission 13 0 and Vanadium Corp. of America v. Clatmants.1 3 1 In the
Union Carbide case, the employee died from lung cancer after he had worked
only eight days for the company. He had been exposed to radioactive materials during his years as a uranium miner for various employers. Union Carbide urged that since his employment with the company was so short, it was
insignificant in causing the lung cancer. A medical expert explained that the
short exposure with Union Carbide probably did not cause lung cancer and
death, but such exposure "was of a level which if continued indefinitely
would increase the probability of lung cancer."1 32 The court of appeals held
that the testimony was sufficient to meet the "last injurious exposure" test in
section 8-51-112 which makes liable "the employer in whose employment the
133
employee was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of such disease."'
' 34
According to the court, "the length of exposure is immaterial." 1
In Vanadium Corp., the employer was found liable as the last Colorado
employer, despite the fact that the claimant left Colorado in 1955 and last
worked for eight years in Utah uranium mines. He died from lung cancer
due to radiation exposure. The Colorado Supreme Court ignored the fact
that the last employer was in Utah since that would have defeated the claim
for benefits. The dependents of the deceased worker filed a claim in Utah,
which was denied. If their claim had been denied in Colorado, no benefits
would have been paid. The supreme court reiterated the familiar litany that
''a contrary result would not comport with the long-recognized rule that the
maining members), § 8-51-107 (1973 & Supp. 1979) (permanent total disability), § 8-51-108
(1973 & Supp. 1979) (permanent partial disability).

127. Id § 8-51-112(1) (Supp. 1979).
128. See notes 28, 34 supra.
129. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112(2) (Supp. 1979).
130. 40 Colo. App. 182, 573 P.2d 938 (1977).

131. 194 Colo. 358, 572 P.2d 1205 (1977).
132. 40 Colo. App. at 184, 573 P.2d at 940.
133. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 8-51-112(1) (Supp. 1979).
134. 40 Colo. App. at 184, 573 P.2d at 940.

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 57:4

Workmen's Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to accomplish 1its
35
humanitarian purpose of assisting injured workers and their families."'
After ruling that Vanadium Corporation was the last employer in Colorado
and consequently should be liable for benefits to the dependents, the court
attempted an explanation:
The result, seemingly harsh in this requirement that one employer
pay for portions of the loss caused by others, is not unlike the usual
rule of proximate cause in tort cases. That familiar rule saddles
one of several tortfeasors, each of whom was a substantial factor in
bringing about the loss, with paying the entire loss caused by all.
the law favors a prompt, efficient remedy for the
There, as here, 36
injured person. '
The supreme court apparently either ignored or forgot that the Workmen's Compensation Act is significantly different from tort cases, or is supis one example of the legislature's
posed to be, and that section 8-47-102
137
attempt to emphasize that difference.
CONCLUSION

The complex verbiage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, the indecisiveness of the courts, and the independence of the referees precludes any
clear understanding of permanent disability under the Colorado statute. Although scattered sections of the Act provide the analytical starting point in
permanent disability cases, the anomalies in the statutory language cause
more confusion than resolution of permanent disability claims. The vacillation of the Colorado appellate courts between the loss of earning capacity
and functional impairment tests for permanent disability contributes to the
chaos. The standard to be applied in a particular case appears left to the
total discretion of each referee. Whatever weight he may give the evidence,
however thin or flimsy, will not be disrupted by the appellate courts.
Although cross-references exist in some of the provisions touching on
permanent disability, the statutory language leaves the impression that each
particular section was drafted without any attempt at providing a cohesive
scheme for awarding permanent disability compensation. Inequities called
to the attention of the legislature have been corrected through piecemeal
amendments. The result is a disparity between benefits provided by various
provisions layered onto discretion in the referee to base an award upon alternative provisions. In the absence of guidelines for exercising this discretion,
employers, insurers, employees, and attorneys have no reasonable means to
evaluate the merits of an individual claim.
Particularly troublesome are the inconsistencies in the apportionment
provisions for cumulative partial disabilities resulting in total disability as
opposed to cumulative partial disabilities resulting in only partial disability
and cumulative hazardous exposure resulting in occupational disease. The
135. 194 Colo. at 360, 572 P.2d at 1206-07.
136. Id at 361, 572 P.2d at 1207.
137. For a discussion of the distinctions between tort theory and workmen's compensation,
see the text accompanying notes 88-95 supra.
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apportionment rate differs for each type of permanent disability. In any
case, however, the protection afforded by the apportionment provisions is
basically illusory because of the burden of proof placed on the employer or
the minimal apportionment allowed. The statutory discrepancies defeat the
beneficent purpose of the Act which, according to judicial interpretation,
was designed to aid injured workers and facilitate hiring of the handicapped.
Accomplishment of this purpose will be possible only if the legislature enacts
a provision that would limit the last employer's liability to that portion of
permanent disability caused by the last accident in an injury case, or that
portion of the disease caused by the last employment in an occupational
disease claim. The subsequent injury fund could absorb all losses attributable to pre-existing conditions regardless of the cause of such conditions.
A second major source of difficulty is the disparity between the amount
of benefits provided under various sections of the Act. The rate of compensation for permanent partial disability plus the statutory ceiling on such benefits seems patently unfair in light of the higher rate for permanent total
disability which is not subject to any artificial limitation on the aggregate
amount payable.
The most significant source of uncertainty, however, is the inability or
unwillingness of the courts to adopt either the loss of earning capacity test or
the functional impairment test as the standard for determining permanent
disability. So long as a choice is not made between these inconsistent philosophies of compensation, uniformity, and certainty in workmen's compensation law is impossible.
One alternative for eliminating the confusion would be to repeal all
sections of the present statute which touch upon permanent disability. A
new section could be enacted that would determine the percentage of permanent disability from 0-100% based on the degree of loss of earning capacity. Apportionment between the last injury or exposure to disease and preexisting conditions should be mandatory with the subsequent injury fund
liable for compensation attributable to any pre-existing condition. All permanent disability, whether total or partial, should be based on the same
weekly rate of compensation with no statutory ceiling on the dollar amount
payable.
If drastic restructuring of the statute is not feasible, at the very least
standards should be promulgated to govern the exercise of discretion by the
referees. The referees as a group could issue guidelines based on the prevailing statute and pertinent case law. Procedures for drafting such guidelines
might be enacted under section 8-46-108 of the Act, which was the touchstone for enacting the present rules of procedure followed by the referees. If
all else fails, attorneys practicing in the field of workmen's compensation in
Colorado are left with only the hope that each referee, vested with the "widest possible discretion," will exercise that discretion in a reasonable manner.

[Vol. 57:4

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

602

APPENDIX I
MORTALITY TABLE*

Completed
Age

Expectancy
of Life,
U.S. Life
Table:
1969-71

Completed
Age

Expectancy
of Life,
U.S. Life
Table:
1969-71

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

70.75
71.19
70.28
69.34
68.39
67.43
66.46
65.49
64.52
63.54
62.57
61.58
60.60
59.62
58.65
57.69
56.73
55.79
54.86
53.93
53.00
52.07
51.15
50.22
49.30
48.37
47.44
46.51
45.58
44.64
43.71
42.77
41.82
40.92
39.99
39.07
38.15

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

37.23
36.32
35.42
34.52
33.63
32.74
31.86
30.99
30.12
29.27
28.42
27.58
26.75
25.93
25.12
24.32
23.53
22.75
21.99
21.23
20.49
19.76
19.05
18.34
17.65
16.97
16.30
15.65
15.00
14.38
13.76
13.16
12.57
12.00
11.43
10.88
10.34

*

CoLO.

REv. STAT. §

Completed
Age
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

13-25-103 (Supp. 1979) (effective July 1, 1977).

Expectancy
of Life,
U.S. Life
Table:
1969-71
9.82
9.32
8.84
8.38
7.93
7.51
7.10
6.70
6.32
5.96
5.62
5.28
4.97
4.68
4.42
4.18
3.94
3.73
3.53
3.35
3.19
3.06
2.95
2.85
2.76
2.69
2.62
2.56
2.51
2.46
2.41
2.37
2.34
2.30
2.27
2.24
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VALUE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION USING MORTALITY TABLE
EFFECTIVE JULY

AGE

EXPEC.*

1, 1977

I%W.U.** WEEKS***

AT

$84

AGE

PER WEEK

EXPEC.*

I%W.U.** WEEKS***

30.12

1315.64

15.6624

16

56.73

2477.97

29.4996

17

55.79

2436.91

29.0108

29.27

1278.51

15.2204

18

54.86

2396.28

28.5272

28.42

1241.39

14.7784
14.3416

19

53.93

2355.66

28.0436

27.58

1204.69

20

53.00

23.1504

27.5600

26.75

1168.44

13.9100

21

52.07

2274.42

27.0764

25.93

1132.62

13.4836

22

51.15

2234.23

26.5980

25.12

1097.24

13.0624

1062.30

12.6464

23

50.22

2193.61

26.1144

24.32

24

49.30

2153.42

25.6360

23.53

1027.79

12.2356

25

48.37

2112.80

25.1524

22.75

993.72

11.8300

26

47.44

2072.18

24.6688

21.99

960.52

11.4348

27

46.51

2031.56

24.1852

21.23

927.33

11.0396

28

45.58

1990.93

23.7016

20.49

895.00

10.6548

29

44.64

1949.88

23.2128

19.76

863.12

10.2752

57

30

43.71

1909.25

22.7292

19.05

832.10

9.9060

31

42.77

1868.19

22.2404

18.34

801.09

9.5368

32

41.82

1826.70

21.7464

17.65

770.95

9.1780

33

40.92

1787.39

21.2784

16.97

741.25

8.8244

34

39.99

1746.76

20.7948

16.30

711.98

8.4760

35

39.07

1706.58

20.3164

15.65

683.59

8.1380

36

38.15

1666.39

19.8380

15.00

655.20

7.8000

37

37.23

1626.21

19.3596

14.38

628.12

7.4776

38

36.32

1586.46

18.8864

13.76

601.04

7.1552

39

35.42

1547.15

18.4184

13.16

574.83

6.8432

40

34.52

1507.83

17.9504

12.57

549.06

6.5364

524.16

6.2400

69

41

33.63

1468.96

17.4876

12.00

42

32.74

1430.08

17.0248

11.43

499.26

5.9436

43

31.86

1391.64

16.5672

10.88

475.24

5.6576

16.1148

10.34

451.65

5.3768

44
*

30.99

1353.64

Life Expectancy

* Dollar value of each one percent unit of permanent partial disability
*** Number of weeks payable at $84 per week for each 1%unit of permanent partial disability
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APPENDIX III

MEMORANDUM

TO:

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION CARRIERS
IN COLORADO

FROM:

JUERETA P. SMITH, DIRECTOR, DIVISION
OF LABOR

SUBJECT:
DATE:

MORTALITY TABLE
JANUARY 6,1978

It has come to my attention that many carriers are not using the
Mortality Table effective July 1, 1977, when entering admissions
for working unit ratings subsequent to that date.
Based upon the Supreme Court Decision CF&I vs. Industrial Commission, 148 Colo 557, 367 P2d 597, 1961, the table in effect at the
time of the rating, not the time of injury, should be used.
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STATE OF COLORADO
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
DIVISION OF LABOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF STATE AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGE
WHEREAS, pursuant to 1973, Colorado Revised Statute 846-113, as amended, the State Average Wage shall be established
by the Director of the Division of Labor annually, on or before July
1; and
WHEREAS, pursuant to the requirements of said statute, the
Director of the Division of Employment and Training has furnished the State Average Weekly Wage to the Director of the Division of Labor, based upon the average of the average weekly
earnings in selected industries in Colorado as published by the
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, weighted by the volume
of employment according to the records of the Division of Employment and Training in each of the selected industries;
WHEREFORE THE DIRECTOR HEREBY ESTABLISHES, effective on 12:01 A.M. July 1, 1979, and for the ensuing
twelve months through and including June 30, 1980:
1. That the Colorado State Average Weekly Wage is $278.42
per week;
2. That the maximum benefit rate for Temporary-Total Disability, Temporary-Partial Disability, and Permanent-Total Disability under the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Colorado shall be eighty percent (80%) of such Average
Weekly Wage for a weekly rate of $222.74;
3. That Temporary-Total Disability, Temporary-Partial
Disability and Permanent-Total Disability benefits shall
be based upon the individual claimant's weekly income
and shall be two-thirds (2/3) of such weekly income, but
shall not exceed the maximum benefit rate set in paragraph 2 of this Order;
4. That to be eligible for the maximum rate of $222.74 the
claimant must have a weekly income of $334.11 or a
monthly income of $1,447.81; and
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Director of the Division of
Labor has caused these presents to be duly executed this 20th day
of June, A.D., 1979.
DIVISION OF LABOR

(s)JOHN KEZER, DIRECTOR
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ALL WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
INSURANCE CARRIERS
ALL SELF-INSURED EMPLOYERS
JOHN KEZER, DIRECTOR

TO:

FROM:

COLORADO DIVISION OF LABOR
DATE:

June 20, 1979

SUBJECT:

BENEFIT RATES FOR WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR THE YEAR BEGINNING
JULY 1, 1979 THROUGH AND INCLUDING
JUNE 30, 1980

As a result of the adjustment in the State Average Weekly
Wage, maximum benefits payable under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Colorado have been changed as follows:
BENEFIT SCHEDULE

DAILY RATE

=

1/7
$31.82

2/7
63.64

3/7
95.46

4/7
127.28

5/7
159.10

6/7
190.92

1 Week

222.74

254.56

286.38

318.20

350.02

381.84

413.66

2 Weeks

445.48

477.30

509.12

540.94

572.76

604.58

636.40

3 Weeks

668.22

700.04

731.86

763.68

795.50

827.32

859.14

4 Weeks

890.96

922.78

954.60

986.42

1,018.24

1,050.06

1,081.88

5 Weeks

1,113.70

1,145.52

1,177.34

1,209.16

1,240.98

1,272.80

1,304.62

6 Weeks

1,336.44

1,368.26

1,400.08

1,431.90

1,463.72

1,495.54

1,527.36

7 Weeks

1,559.18

1,591.00

1,622.82

1,654.64

1,686.46

1,718.28

1,750.10

8 Weeks

1,781.92

1,813.74

1,845.56

1,877.38

1,909.20

1,941.02

1,972.84

2,004.66 2,036.48. 2,068.30

2,100.12

2,131.94

2,163.76

2,195.58

2,291.04

2,322.86

2,354.68 2,386.50

2,418.32

9 Weeks
10 Weeks

2,227.40 2,259.22

EFFECTIVE DATE - JULY 1, 1979 AT 12:01 A.M.
MAXIMUM COMPENSATION: To qualify, a Wage of $334.11
per week must be earned or $1,447.81 per month must be
earned. (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-102)
MEDICAL MAXIMUM: $20,000 (1973 C.R.S. 8-49-101)
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION: Charged under the
$20,000 medical maximum.
FACIAL & BODILY DISFIGUREMENT: Maximum $2,000
(1973 C.R.S. 8-51-105)
MAXIMUM TEMPORARY PARTIAL: None! (1973 C.R.S. 8-

51-103)
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MAXIMUM PERMANENT PARTIAL:

$26,292 (1973 C.R.S. 8-

51-108)
SUBSEQUENT INJURY FUND: No dependents at all $15,000. Partial dependents paid first, then balance paid to the
Subsequent Injury Fund to maximum of $15,000. (1973 C.R.S.
8-51-106)
TEMPORARY TOTAL BENEFITS: Payable every Two (2)
Weeks. (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-101)
RETROACTIVE 'PAYMENTS: Payable after Two (2) Weeks
(15th Day) (1973 C.R.S. 8-51-101)
P.T. BENEFITS: Payable to maximum of $222.74 per Week
(C.R.S. 1973 8-51-107)
P.P. DISABILITY: All cases paid at $84 per week; $4,368 per year
(1973 C.R.S. 8-51-108)
YEARLY T.T. BENEFITS: $11,582.48 (maximum) (1973 C.R.S.
8-51-102)
FUNERAL MAXIMUM: $1,000 (1973 C.R.S. 8-50-107)
FATAL CASES: Maxiinum of $222.74 per week (1973 C.R.S. 850-103)
Lifetime Benefits for widows and widowers totally dependent.
(1973 C.R.S. 8-50-101)
Upon Remarriage of Widow or Widower, a Two-Year Lump
Sum without discount, less lump sums previoasly paid, must be
paid to such widow or widower, if no dependent children.
(1973 C.R.S. 8-50-106)
Social Security Offset: 100% offset of benefits to widow or widower and their dependents. (1973 C.R.S. 8-50-103)
Dependent Children: Minor dependents' benefits are included
in the lifetime benefits to widows and widowers. (1973 C.R.S.

8-50-101)
Minimum Death Benefit:
or $55.69 per week.
(1973 C.R.S. 8-50-103)

25% of Maximum Weekly Benefit

